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Introduction1
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was expected to raise industrial
wages in Mexico, perhaps not to the U.S. level but at least higher than before; and the
Mexican maquiladora industry was the prime candidate for this type of improvement
because it is the most closely integrated with the United States and because its
wages used to be just half of those paid in the manufacturing sector. The objective
of this chapter is to test this hypothesis of an upwards convergence between maquila-
dora and manufacturing wages, which, together, comprise all of Mexico’s industry.
The principal finding is that convergence has been downwards instead of
upwards; that is, with manufacturing wages coming down toward the maquiladora
level and with maquiladora wages remaining constant. This is what is meant by
the term “maquiladorization” of the manufacturing industry: a historical shift in the
level of industrial wages in which the lower-paying industry has become the stan-
dard for what had traditionally been the higher-paying one. The downward turn
in the structure of industrial remunerations is explained in this chapter within the
context of NAFTA and free trade in general.
To put this change into perspective and demonstrate the degree to which it is
related to free trade, data series spanning several decades are used, making it possi-
ble to draw links between the most dramatic movements in wage levels and significant
changes in trade liberalization (the different measures taken to open Mexico’s mar-
ket to international commerce). These data series start back in the mid-1970s, when
commercial policy was still protectionist, and move through the liberalization process
that began in the mid-1980s, culminating in the NAFTA agreement in 1994, which,
by 2008, had completed the process of tariff elimination in North America.
Data on average industrial wages are used to make nationwide generalizations
about how well workers of the maquiladora and manufacturing industries have
fared under this liberalization process.2 This aggregate data is then disaggregated
into different branches of industry, matching those of the maquiladora with corre-
sponding sectors of manufacturing to provide a more detailed analysis that reveals
*Researcher at UNAM’s Center for Research on North America.
1 The author thanks Marcela Osnaya Ortega for her help with the graphs and tables in this article.
2 Wages include fringe benefits and are measured for all direct workers, that is, production workers,
supervisors and technicians, but not clerical employees or management.
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important differences hidden within the average industrial data. A few branches of
manufacturing were able to avoid sacrificing their wage levels when faced with the
international competition brought by liberalization; but others responded by lower-
ing their wages to the same level as those paid in the maquiladoras; and a third group
of manufacturing branches fell still further below this mark.
The correlation between the relative wage levels of these three types of man-
ufacturing branches and their structural characteristics, along with the specific
liberalization schedules to which they were subjected and the steps they took to
make their production competitive, are all factors that will help understand the
relationship between wages and free trade. The structural characteristics of the dif-
ferent manufacturing branches include variables such as whether the establishments
are large or small, capital- or labor-intensive, have received foreign investment or not,
as well as whether their production is internationalized or concentrated in the
country of origin. Also of importance are the differences in the way liberalization
measures were applied to specific manufacturing branches and the way the latter
responded, ranging from those that had already modernized their productive meth-
ods to those that converted to maquiladora-style production, to those that did noth-
ing to prevent the impending onslaught except reduce wages.
It would be too detailed to analyze each branch of manufacturing since the
objective of this chapter is to give a general overview of the different types of strate-
gies used for managing the liberalization process and their impact on wage levels.
Therefore, just one example of each of the three different types of manufacturing
strategies will be analyzed in detail here, making only summary references to the
rest. The full study, including all branches of industry, is available for consultation.3
The comparison with the maquiladora industry is used as a control, since there was
no reason to expect them to be negatively affected by free trade, having always oper-
ated in a competitive international environment; on the contrary, they were expect-
ed to raise their wages.
The first section of the chapter analyzes average wages in both industries and
nationwide liberalization measures; the second section does the same but on the
branch level, with the three different examples of manufacturing strategies deal-
ing with liberalization; and the conclusions discuss some of the larger issues relat-
ed to free trade and its impact on wages.
Average Manufacturing versus Maquiladora
Wages and General Liberalization Measures
In graph 1: “Wages in the Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries (1975-2006)”
we see changes in real wages in both industries over the course of three deca-
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3 Monica Gambrill, “El impacto del TLCAN en las remuneraciones de la industria de la transformación
en México”, in Monica Gambrill, ed., Diez años del TLCAN en México (Mexico City: Universidad Na-
cional Autónoma de México-CISAN/IIE/FE), 57-100.
des.4 It is clear at first glance that the most pronounced drops in the wages of
both industries occurred in 1983 and 1995, corresponding, on the one hand, to the
debt crisis that began at the end of 1982 and, on the other, to the financial crisis
that began in late 1994. What is not clear is how to distinguish the effect of these
two crises from that of the liberalization measures that also began in the mid-
1980s and then culminated in January 1994 with NAFTA. This is the crux of most
disputes about the relationship between free trade and wages in Mexico, and it is
necessary to take a position on it from the beginning.
If all drops in manufacturing wages, from their high point in 1982 onward, were
attributed to free trade, then it would be a closed case: free trade would have to
be considered extremely harmful to Mexican workers. However, if the 1993 crisis is
attributed to debt accumulated during the previous protectionist period —incurred
to cover the deficit in the balance of payments but leading to catastrophic inflation,
devaluation and national insolvency— then the question is how much of the sub-
sequent decline in real wages should be attributed to the failure of protectionism
instead of blaming it on free trade? The stance taken here is that the 1993 crisis was
the product of the old system, not the new. This is not to say that free trade is bene-
volent for industries and workers; rather that, in order to measure it correctly,
those junctures in which liberalization accelerated have to be focused on, separat-
ing them carefully from the effects of the debt crisis.
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GRAPH 1
WAGES IN THE MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES (1975-2006)
Maquiladora Manufacturing
Source: Table 1, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries,
1975-2006” (see the Statistical Appendix of this chapter).
The cumulative loss in manufacturing wages during the crises of 1983 and
1984 was 28.2 percent, but by 1985 this tendency had ended.5 This drop in wages
cannot be attributed to trade liberalization because it was not until 1985 that
quantitative restrictions on imports (quotas) began to be eliminated. However, the
second sharp reduction in wages does seem to be related to trade, since it coin-
cided with Mexico’s entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
in 1986, causing a cumulative loss of 19.5 percent during the ensuing three-year
period, from 1986 to 1988. During the following six years, from 1989 through 1994,
the downward trend came to an end and wages recovered 28.3 percent, ending even
higher than they had been before the beginning of the GATT sub-period. So, this pos-
itive reaction could be interpreted as the result of the industrial restructuring that
was put into effect to counter the impact of GATT liberalization, as well as an ini-
tial positive response to NAFTA during its first year in force, 1994.
With respect to the 1995 financial crisis, the greatest impact on wage levels,
which brought them down 30.5 percent, was concentrated in the first two years
of the crisis. Even though this period overlapped with NAFTA, during its second and
third years in effect, the case for attributing the financial crisis to free trade is cir-
cumstantial: same time, same place, same leaders, but not directly related to the free
trade agreement itself. Therefore, the extent to which losses in real wages incurred
during this crisis should be attributed to free trade is, at best, questionable. That said,
what can clearly be demonstrated is the unsatisfactory growth rate after the finan-
cial crisis, from 1997 to 2006, which is the best measure of NAFTA’s performance.
From 1997 through 2006, growth in wages has been very slow, albeit constant,
yielding a cumulative increase of 22.7 percent in 10 years. This might seem like
a good record but manufacturing wages did not recoup nearly as rapidly in this
period as they did in the previous six-year GATT sub-period. The end result was
that in 2006, real wages were still 15 percent below their 1994 level when NAFTA
came into effect and 37 percent below their starting point in 1977. This is far
from what was expected to result from the NAFTA agreement, and, therefore, it
cannot be considered to have been successful in raising manufacturing wages.
Maquiladora wages serve as a point of comparison for measuring what has hap-
pened in the manufacturing industry because they are not negatively impacted by
free trade. Having always had to adjust their costs to world market prices, their
labor policy was designed to be extremely competitive, which is why they were
able to pay only a bit more than half the manufacturing wage. This can be seen
in graph 1: they were 42 percent lower in 1977 and still 43 percent below in 1985.
From 1985 on, the gap between the two industries lessened, not because maquiladora
wages went up but rather because manufacturing wages went down. Twenty-one years
later, in 2006, real maquiladora wages were only 8.5 percent higher than in 1985.
This is not to say that maquiladora wages did not react to the crisis in Mexico.
On the contrary, they had negative growth rates of -22.8 percent in 1983-1984
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and of -12.6 in 1995-1996. They also responded to free trade in the same direc-
tion as manufacturing but on a very different scale. In the GATT sub-period, they
lost 6.4 percent of their buying power during the first three years (1986-1988),
but then regained 11.5 percent of it (1989-1994). In the NAFTA sub-period, their
buying power increased 18.6 percent overall (1997-2006), however with two dis-
tinct trends, having gone up through 2002 but consistently down thereafter. This
change from 2003 onward is related to the transfer of assembly production to
China, sending maquiladora wages on a slightly different path from manufactur-
ing, where wages were slowly but continually rising.
As we have seen, the overall trend from 1974 through 2006 has been for man-
ufacturing wages to fall closer and closer to the maquiladora level, which is what
is meant by the term “maquiladorization”. More specifically, in the NAFTA sub-
period, wage levels in these two industries began to move in perfect synchrony
with each other. From 1996 to 2002, manufacturing wages had completed their
downward adjustment to the competitive level paid in the maquiladora industry.
However, after China came on board in 2003, this synchronization ended and,
although the wage levels of the two industries have remained much closer togeth-
er than in any previous sub-period, they did begin to separate slightly.
Where this competition with China will lead industrial wages after 2006 is, of
course, unknown; but hints of what is to come after the NAFTA sub-period will
become clearer after disaggregating the industrial data onto the branch level to
see which specific manufacturing branches synchronized their wages with the
maquiladoras, which remained above this level and which fell below. This is what
will be done in the following section.
Manufacturing and Maquiladora Wages in Select Industrial Branches
And Branch-specific Liberalization Measures
To examine more closely the double impact liberalization and restructuring have
had on wages, data from both the manufacturing and the maquiladora industries
will be disaggregated into industrial branches. Of the nine branches that comprise the
maquiladora industry, only three will be compared to their equivalents in the man-
ufacturing industry, due to space limitations in this chapter. However, these three
are representative of the rest in that they are examples of the three different pat-
terns of interaction that have been detected between maquiladoras and manufac-
turing in a larger study. Similarities and differences are based on the degree to
which specific manufacturing branches have converted to the fragmented pro-
ductive process used in the maquiladoras, as well as on the degree to which they
have reduced their wages to the maquiladora level.
The first comparison is between the “electric and electronic” branches of the
two industries studied. Liberalization was embraced early in this branch of man-
ufacturing and was reinforced by sector-wide agreements that further speeded its
commercial opening. Above and beyond the nationwide elimination of import per-
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mits in 1985 and Mexico’s entry into the GATT in 1986, the rest of the sectoral
protectionist policy that had previously prevailed in this industrial branch was also
dismantled. In 1987, two Trade Ministry (SECOFI) decrees changed this sector’s
specific protectionist program; and a 1990 presidential decree eliminated practi-
cally all tariff and non-tariff barriers in the area of computers.6 This radical liber-
alization continued deepening not only under NAFTA but also later, in 1998, under
the first Sectoral Program (Prosec),7 with any country at all, even those without a
reciprocal trade agreement with Mexico. Hence, commercial policies applicable
to this manufacturing branch were harmonized with those that used to be restrict-
ed to the maquiladoras and other export industries.
Liberalization in this manufacturing branch led to the adoption of the same pro-
duction style used in the maquiladoras: i.e. fragmentation of production chains and
outsourcing of foreign intermediary goods. As a result, industrial activity in the man-
ufacturing branch has centered on the assembly of these imported parts and pieces.8
Up until the 1990s, both the manufacturing and maquiladora branches were still far
removed from the production of competitive intermediary goods and challenged to
deepen their productive processes. However, in the 1990s, a new image of the “elec-
tric-electronic” branches began to emerge. They were adding more national content
to their products by incorporating complex manufacturing and design operations into
their operations.9 All of these commercial and structural adjustments impacted the
industrial branches’ remunerations in one way or the other.
As can be seen in graph 2: “Wages in the Electric and Electronics Assembly
Branches: Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries (1980-2006),” manufactur-
ing wages fell not only in the 1983-1984 crisis but also continually through 1988,
almost to the point of convergence with maquiladoras. This happened from as far
back as the GATT sub-period and is due not only to the nationwide liberalization
that this multilateral trade agreement implied but also to the sector-specific meas-
ures described above. Even though manufacturing wages improved a bit between
1991 and 1995, resisting the financial crisis of that year with no significant impact,
from 1996 on they converged with the maquiladoras. This is not to deny that there
was an improvement in maquiladora wages in the NAFTA sub-period and that man-
ufacturing kept up with them, probably due to the upgrading of production that
took place in this branch in the 1990s; however, this trend reversed in maquilado-
ras starting in 2003 due to competition with China, and it is yet to be seen whether
manufacturing will follow or not.
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ferent products.
9 Sergio Ordóñez, “La nueva industria electrónica en México en el contexto del Tratado de Libre Co-
mercio de Norteamérica” (paper, International Colloquium on “El Impacto del TLCAN en México a
los 10 Años,” National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, June 29-30, 2004).
On the basis of this branch-specific information, it can be concluded that its
wages behaved in a very different way from the national average seen in the first
graph. This manufacturing branch is characterized by its early and deep liberaliza-
tion, especially in the area of electronics, which determined not only its conversion
to fragmented production but also its early convergence with wage levels in the
corresponding maquiladora branch. This example of convergence is not restricted
to the “electric-electronic” branch; it happened in other branches as well, such as
“tools” and “clothing”. Hence, “convergence” with maquiladora wages characterizes a
specific type of manufacturing branches, as they restructure in order to deal with
liberalization. It is not, however, the only typology hidden within the national aver-
age; two more are yet to be seen.
The second comparison can be seen in graph 3: “Wages in the Furniture Branch:
Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries (1980-2006).” The manufacturing branch
reduced its wages from quite a high level before the 1983 debt crisis to below the
level of the maquiladora branch, as far back as 1987 in the middle of the GATT sub-
period. Even though it rallied a bit before NAFTA went into effect, it fell again with
the 1995 financial crisis. Although it contained its fall in 1998 and then began to
rise again afterwards, it has never caught up with maquiladora wages. This is because
maquiladora wages have been growing steadily from 1996 on, despite competition
with China, due in part to Mexico’s proximity to the United States which gives heavy,
bulky products like furniture a competitive advantage. However this advantage would
work in favor of the manufacturing branch as well; so, the decisive variables have
more to do with the efficiency of their production: the economies of scale that their
larger size affords, as well as the efficiency that their peculiar style of fragmented
production brings to their ability to compete in the world market.
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GRAPH 2
WAGES IN THE ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY BRANCHES:
MAQUILADORAS AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Maquiladora Manufacturing
Source: Table 2, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Machinery, Equipment and Electronics
Apparatuses and Articles Assembly Branch, and in the Electric and Electronic Accesories
Branch:Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries, 1980-2006” (see the StatisticalAppendix
of this chapter).
Manufacturing’s inability to pay wages comparable to the maquiladora’s has to
do both with its structural characteristics and the way liberalization was carried
out in this branch. It was not until late 1986 that government permits to import
wooden products and metallic furniture were no longer required; even afterwards,
average tariffs fell slowly, and were still 18 percent to 19 percent in 1988.10 Despite
having resisted the trade opening, this manufacturing branch still had to face
competition later with imported final goods, more in the NAFTA than in the GATT sub-
period. What is more, no sector-specific agreements were adopted allowing free
access to imported intermediate goods required to modernize production until a
very recent Prosec. Neither private enterprise nor government led a concerted effort
to prepare this manufacturing branch for the trade opening by implementing a
restructuring plan. This is due to the fact that it is composed predominantly of small
businesses, working with traditional designs and low productivity levels.
“Furniture” is representative of other branches such as “shoes,” “toys and sport-
ing goods,” where the traditional relationship between manufacturing and maqui-
ladora wages is also inverted. The fact that some manufacturing branches fall
below the maquiladora parameter represents a historical change in Mexico, demon-
strating just how grave the situation of these traditional manufacturing branches
is. The only strategy they had was delaying liberalization as long as possible, open-
ing up to international commerce late and half-way, without discriminating clearly
between the benefits of protection for final goods and the disadvantages of pro-
tecting the intermediate goods they use. By charging the same tariffs on both kinds
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GRAPH 3
WAGES IN THE FURNITURE BRANCH: MAQUILADORAS
AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Maquiladora Manufacturing
Source: Table 3, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Construction, Reconstruction andAssembly
of Transport Equipment andAccesories Branch: Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries,
1980-2006)” (see the Statistical Appendix of this chapter).
of goods, the companies deprived themselves of free access to intermediate goods
that would have been indispensable for industrial restructuring and successful
competition with imported final goods later on. It is important to recognize that
this alternative is worse than “maquiladorization.”
The third comparison can be seen in graph 4: “Wages in the Transport Equip-
ment and Accessories Branch: Maquiladora and Manufacturing Industries (1980-
2006).” The wage curve for manufacturing is higher than the national average and
very different from the other two cases above that either converged with the maqui-
ladoras or fell significantly below them. In “transport,” manufacturing wages started
off more than double maquiladora wages and ended up about a third above it, far
from recovering their initial level but also with a significant distance from conver-
gence with maquiladoras. They also suffered during the periods of liberalization: in
the GATT sub-period, from 1986 to 1988 when import permits protecting the auto-
mobile industry were done away with and tariffs were reduced to 17 percent;11
and again at the beginning of the NAFTA sub-period, from 1997 to 1999, when they
remained flat. However, after each of these downturns, the wage level went back
up again to the same purchasing capacity as before the corresponding period of
commercial opening. Thus, this branch of manufacturing avoided the permanent
traumas that the other two branches experienced during the course of their liber-
alization, outperforming the national average. The question is, why was it relative-
ly sheltered from the onslaught of foreign competition?
This independence from the maquiladora norm is due to a unique combination
of two factors: the initial protection that the sector-specific auto agreement pro-
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GRAPH 4
WAGES IN THE TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT AND ACCESORIES BRANCH:
MAQUILADORAS AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Source: Table 4, “Wages of Direct Workers in the Construction, Reconstruction andAssembly
of Transport Equipment andAccesories Branch: Maquiladoras and Manufacturing Industries,
1980-2006)” (see the Statistical Appendix of this chapter).
vided it from imports of assembled vehicles for 22 years, encouraging them to man-
ufacture auto parts that the government obliged foreign companies to incorporate
into their final products; and, simultaneously, the fact that this same agreement
began opening this manufacturing branch up to the importation of auto parts from
1982 onward. Another decree in the GATT sub-period, in 1989, completely freed up
importation of intermediary goods, at the same time as maintaining tariff and non-
tariff barriers on the importation of finished vehicles, thus reinforcing this early
strategic decision to specialize in intermediary goods. And with NAFTA, motor vehicles
were one of the last sectors to open to foreign competition.12 Despite this protection,
it had to conform to international standards because it sold its parts to maquilado-
ras and other foreign assembly plants.13 However, at the same time, this influence
was attenuated by the greater profit margin that protection from imports of final
goods afforded the assembly companies, all of which helped keep wages higher.
Thus, this manufacturing branch was shaped by a virtuous combination of pro-
tection and liberalization. It is an example of what can be accomplished within the
logic of fragmented production, having enjoyed a longstanding, consistent indus-
trial policy that encouraged local production of intermediate goods. To a large extent,
this is due to the fact that the companies in this branch are large enough to influence
the government in designing an industrial policy appropriate to them. “Transport”
forms part of a third category of industrial branches that consistently maintained
their wages higher than those of the maquiladoras, primarily oriented toward assem-
bly. Other examples of manufacturing branches with wage levels significantly above
maquiladoras are “food” and “chemicals,” where the gap between the two industries
has even increased over time. This is due to the fact that they use production tech-
nology that is completely different from the fragmented maquiladora model, employ-
ing highly specialized labor with wages that compare very favorably with those of less
skilled assembly workers. Even though they were not sheltered from foreign com-
petition, they are competitive enough to hold their own.
Conclusions
The general conclusion is that free trade eliminates the differences between the man-
ufacturing and maquiladora industries, not only by bringing the former’s wages
down to the latter’s but also by creating conditions that make it advantageous to
adopt the fragmented production style that characterizes globalization. This is
perceived in Mexico as a historic loss, both for the workers of the manufacturing
industry who see the possibility of earning a decent living slip away from them
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and for the owners of these industries who often end up in bankruptcy or having
to sell their businesses. An overly simplified response to this is the desire to return to
old-style protectionism, as it existed before the 1982 crisis, without recognizing that
that system’s inefficiencies were what caused the debt crisis to begin with. A more
realistic response is attempted here, identifying those elements within the new sys-
tem of fragmented production that allow the standard of living to improve.
Fragmented production is not limited to assembly operations only; it also requires
the production of intermediate goods, not to mention the participation of the mul-
tinational corporations that subcontract these different processes and commer-
cialize the final products worldwide. What we have seen in this chapter, once the
national average of manufacturing wages was broken down into a variety of indus-
trial branches, is that these branches have reacted in three different ways to lib-
eralization, only one of which can be considered successful. The formula for this
successful adaptation seems to have been getting the right combination of early
protection from imported intermediate goods, at the same time as gradually open-
ing to imported final goods, before the liberalization process came into full swing.
This was achieved with the help of government intervention that fine-tuned the
trade opening to protect high-value local manufacturing while at the same time
allowing sufficient foreign competition to force conversion to international best-
practice standards. In lieu of an industrial policy of this type, what the interna-
tional market propitiates is specialization in the assembly of imported intermediate
goods.
Branches like transport are the basis for this formula because they incorporate
both the manufacture and the final assembly of intermediate parts, with the end
result of keeping wage levels significantly higher than those in the other two cate-
gories of industrial branches. It seems that the most important variable for branches
like transport is having had the proper combination of early exposure to interna-
tional competition, plus elements of prolonged protection from imported goods,
determined by their branch-specific industrial policy. Despite suffering temporar-
ily from the negative impact of liberalization, both in the GATT and in the NAFTA
sub-periods, they were able on each occasion to return to the same wage level
they had had before. This indicates successful restructuring in tune with the new
conditions of the globalized economy, adapting successfully to competition from
abroad, even though wages in these branches were never able to return to their
1980 highs.
Manufacturing branches like electric-electronics have been shaped more by
international market forces than by national industrial policy; hence, their orienta-
tion has been toward adopting the assembly model, although recently they began
to manufacture some of their own intermediate goods in Mexico. It is important to
recognize this possibility for the production of intermediate goods to evolve out of
assembly operations, even though it had not existed previously to liberalization, as
well as the possibility of reinforcing this evolution through industrial policy. Remunera-
tions in these manufacturing branches were negatively impacted at first when
obliged to adopt the assembly model, with downward convergence to the level of
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the maquiladoras; but, with the beginning of production of intermediate goods, both
maquiladora and manufacturing wages began to increase. However, the multina-
tional corporations that subcontract both assembly and production of intermediate
goods in the maquiladoras put a cap on these wage increases by sending some of
their operations to China. Whether manufacturing will follow maquiladoras down-
ward or not might depend on whether an industrial policy is put in place to raise
productivity in Mexico.
Manufacturing branches like furniture, in the absence of an industrial policy
to prod them toward a restructuring plan, have resisted liberalization through
political pressure for continued protection. However, this does not constitute an
acceptable alternative for the small and medium-sized producers of traditional
goods in these manufacturing branches; rather, it drags their agony out until they
finally close down or sell out to larger ones able to convert to the assembly model
and keeps their wages stagnating below the maquiladora level. Protectionism in
an open market is unlike protectionism decades ago, when it allowed excess prof-
its to be accumulated at the expense of the consumer. Now, its consequences are
worse than those of the assembly model because it has no possibility of compet-
ing with imports and, hence, cannot guarantee a decent living wage to workers.
There should have been a plan to help these industries restructure their produc-
tion before the liberalization process began but it is still possible for them to find
a place in the new system of fragmented production, either as assemblers or as pro-
ducers of intermediate goods.
Despite the rigors of fragmented production, it is possible to work within its
logic to find ways to upgrade production from assembly to manufacture of inter-
mediate goods, and then possibly to brand-name products whose production is
scattered among different subcontracting companies around the world. Moving
up this ladder requires support from the state in the form of a congruent indus-
trial policy, which would benefit not only the companies involved but also their
workers and the population in general since more sophisticated manufacturing
affords higher wages and adds more value locally, thus expanding the tax base and
allowing the government to provide better services. Creating a virtuous circle of
this kind is one way to move forward toward industrial development, although it is
not the only one because, as we have seen, there are other manufacturing branch-
es with different production models, capable of adding more value and paying higher
wages than in the branches characterized by fragmented production. Therefore, we
recognize that there are limits to what industrial policy can or should do to promote
upgrading in fragmented production —since it has to take into account the needs
of other manufacturing branches, as well as other sectors, such as agriculture and
services— but in it lies the key to avoiding the “maquiladorization” that an unabridged
free market economy tends to extend throughout manufacturing branches.
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Statistical Appendix
TABLE 1. WAGE OF DIRECT WORKERS IN THE MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1975-2006)
Average Inflation Real Growth Average Real Growth
Daily Wage Index Wage Rate Daily Wage Wage Rate
Workers and Maquiladora Manu-
Technicians December Industry Workers facturing
Maquiladora 1982=100 (Dec. MAQUI- MANUFAC- (Dec. MANUFAC-
Year Industry1 1982 pesos) LADORA TURING 1982 pesos) TURING
1975 0.094 13.4 0.697
19761 0.117 15.6 0.754 8.2
1977 0.151 20.1 0.753 -0.1 0.261 1.298
1978 0.173 23.6 0.732 -2.9 0.302 1.278 -1.5
1979 0.197 27.9 0.705 -3.7 0.353 1.264 -1.1
1980 0.227 35.2 0.645 -8.5 0.439 1.245 -1.5
1981 0.290 45.1 0.643 -0.3 0.584 1.296 4.0
1982 0.495 71.6 0.691 7.5 0.926 1.293 -0.2
1983 0.794 144.6 0.549 -20.6 1.435 0.992 -23.3
1984 1.285 239.3 0.537 -2.2 2.219 0.927 -6.5
1985 1.998 377.5 0.529 -1.5 3.497 0.927 -0.1
1986 3.603 703.0 0.513 -3.2 5.989 0.852 -8.1
19872 8.459 1,629.6 0.519 1.3 12.746 0.782 -8.2
1988 17.262 3,490.1 0.495 -4.7 26.041 0.746 -4.6
1989 22.104 4,188.4 0.528 6.7 33.365 0.797 6.8
1990 28.024 5,304.7 0.528 0.1 42.965 0.810 1.7
1991 33.677 6,506.8 0.518 -2.0 55.122 0.847 4.6
1992 39.627 7,515.9 0.527 1.9 67.712 0.901 6.3
1993 43.211 8,248.8 0.524 -0.6 76.260 0.924 2.6
19943 48.692 8,823.4 0.552 5.3 84.416 0.957 3.5
1995 60.844 11,911.5 0.511 -7.4 88.051 0.739 -22.7
1996 77.482 16,006.5 0.484 -5.2 106.500 0.665 -10.0
1997 95.407 19,308.0 0.494 2.1 128.585 0.666 0.1
1998 113.925 22,383.4 0.509 3.0 152.888 0.683 2.6
1999 135.586 26,095.8 0.520 2.1 180.885 0.693 1.5
2000 156.772 28,572.7 0.549 5.6 210.566 0.737 6.3
2001 177.172 30,392.2 0.583 6.2 238.822 0.786 6.6
2002 198.340 31,921.1 0.621 6.6 254.406 0.797 1.4
2003 204.721 33,372.5 0.613 -1.3 268.985 0.806 1.1
2004 209.471 34,937.2 0.600 -2.3 283.324 0.811 0.6
2005 211.169 36,330.5 0.581 -3.1 295.136 0.812 0.2
2006 216.034 37,649.1 0.574 -1.3 307.226 0.816 0.5
1 57 categories of activity, 1,157 establishments. 2 129 categories of activity, 3,172 establishments.
3 205 categories of activity, 6,726 establishments.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-1993,
1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 at
http://www.inegi.gob.mx; ibid., Estadística industrial anual 1975-1982; ibid., Encuesta industrial anual
1983-1986; ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994,1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002; índice de precios de la Comisión Nacional de Salarios Mí-
nimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by the Banco de México from 1983 on.
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TABLE 2. WAGE OF DIRECT WORKERS IN THE MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT, ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC
APPARATUSES AND ARTICLES ASSEMBLY BRANCH, AND IN THE ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC ACCES-
SORIES BRANCH: MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Wages Wages Inflation Real Real Real
Index Wages Wages Maquiladora
Wages
Real
MAQUI- Manufac-
MAQUI- MANUFAC- Dec. LADORA MANUFAC- turing
Year LADORAS TURING1 1982=100 INDUSTRY TURING1 Wages
1980 0.231 0.384 35.2 0.654 1.089 0.60
1981 0.292 0.480 45.1 0.649 1.064 0.61
1982 0.504 0.777 71.6 0.704 1.084 0.65
1983 0.811 1.149 144.6 0.561 0.795 0.71
1984 1.319 1.854 239.3 0.551 0.775 0.71
1985 2.107 2.717 377.5 0.558 0.720 0.78
1986 3.898 4.716 703.0 0.555 0.671 0.83
1987 9.216 10.271 1,629.6 0.566 0.630 0.90
1988 19.005 20.929 3,490.1 0.545 0.600 0.91
1989 24.868 26.988 4,188.4 0.594 0.644 0.92
1990 30.576 33.956 5,304.7 0.576 0.640 0.90
1991 37.236 43.417 6,506.8 0.572 0.667 0.86
1992 43.509 51.892 7,515.9 0.579 0.690 0.84
1993 46.434 57.678 8,248.8 0.563 0.699 0.81
1994 51.077 59.495 8,823.4 0.579 0.674 0.86
1995 65.023 79.004 11,911.5 0.546 0.663 0.82
1996 84.226 93.956 16,006.5 0.526 0.587 0.90
1997 105.594 113.413 19,308.0 0.547 0.587 0.93
1998 127.152 131.640 22,383.4 0.568 0.588 0.97
1999 151.200 153.275 26,095.8 0.579 0.587 0.99
2000 176.458 175.036 28,572.7 0.618 0.613 1.01
2001 203.105 202.481 30,392.2 0.668 0.666 1.00
2002 228.717 217.535 31,921.1 0.717 0.681 1.05
2003 235.805 221.510 33,372.5 0.707 0.664 1.06
2004 236.608 234.613 34,937.2 0.677 0.672 1.01
2005 235.835 247.176 36,330.5 0.649 0.680 0.95
2006 237.979 257.162 37,649.1 0.632 0.683 0.93
1 From 1995 to 2006, classes 3831, manufacture and/or assembly of machinery, equipment and electrical
accessories (including the generation of electricity); 3832, manufacture and/or assembly of electronic
equipment for radio, television, communications and medical use; and 3833, manufacture and/or assem-
bly of apparatuses and accessories for domestic use, excluding electronics. From 1987-1994, class 3700
manufacture and assembly of machinery, equipment, apparatuses, accessories, electrical and electronic
articles and their parts. From 1980-1986, classes 3721, 3723, 3731 and 3741.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-1993,
1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 at http://www.
inegi.gob.mx; ibid., Estadística industrial anual 1975-1982; ibid., Encuesta industrial anual 1983-1986;
ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006; Índice de precios de la Comisión Nacional de Sala-
rios Mínimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by the Banco de México from 1983 on.
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TABLE3.WAGE OFDIRECTWORKERS IN THEFURNITURE, FURNITUREACCESORIESAND OTHERWOOD
AND METAL PRODUCTS BRANCH: MAQUILADORAS AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Wages Wages Inflation Real Real Real
Index Wages Wages Maquiladora
Wages
Real
Manufac-
Year
1980 0.250 0.330 35.2 0.708 0.938 0.755
1981 0.309 0.425 45.1 0.686 0.942 0.728
1982 0.471 0.674 71.6 0.658 0.941 0.699
1983 0.754 1.070 144.6 0.521 0.740 0.705
1984 1.249 1.714 239.3 0.522 0.716 0.728
1985 2.032 2.440 377.5 0.538 0.646 0.832
1986 3.626 3.764 703.0 0.516 0.535 0.963
1987 8.654 8.026 1,629.6 0.531 0.493 1.078
1988 17.334 15.829 3,490.1 0.497 0.454 1.095
1989 22.433 20.173 4,188.4 0.536 0.482 1.112
1990 27.884 25.767 5,304.7 0.526 0.486 1.082
1991 33.135 32.612 6,506.8 0.509 0.501 1.016
1992 38.293 40.465 7,515.9 0.509 0.538 0.946
1993 41.085 47.312 8,248.8 0.498 0.574 0.868
1994 48.935 50.306 8,823.4 0.555 0.570 0.973
1995 60.159 51.615 11,911.5 0.505 0.433 1.166
1996 76.254 60.392 16,006.5 0.476 0.377 1.263
1997 99.499 70.624 19,308.0 0.515 0.366 1.409
1998 121.308 85.749 22,383.4 0.542 0.383 1.415
1999 150.407 105.741 26,095.8 0.576 0.405 1.422
2000 171.688 125.819 28,572.7 0.601 0.440 1.365
2001 193.541 144.988 30,392.2 0.637 0.477 1.335
2002 210.896 154.944 31,921.1 0.661 0.485 1.361
2003 221.410 169.378 33,372.5 0.663 0.508 1.307
2004 237.742 180.655 34,937.2 0.680 0.517 1.316
2005 247.019 190.318 36,330.5 0.680 0.524 1.298
2006 260.480 197.725 37,649.1 0.692 0.525 1.317
1 From 1995 to 2006, branches 332001, manufacture and repair of furniture, principally wooden, and
branch 381300, manufacture and repair of metallic furniture and furniture accessories. From 1987
to 1994, class 2711, manufacture of wooden furniture, and class 3520, manufacture of principally
metallic furniture and furniture and furniture accessories. From 1987 to 1994, class 2711, manufac-
ture of wooden furniture, and class 3520, manufacture of principally metallic furniture and furniture
accessories. From 1980-1986, class 3521, manufacture of furniture and furniture accessories, princi-
pally metallic.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-
1993, 1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988,
1989, 1990, 1991,1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002; Índice de
precios de la Comisión Nacional de Salarios Mínimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by
the Banco de México from 1983 on.
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TABLE 4. WAGES OF DIRECT WORKERS IN THE CONSTRUCTION, RECONSTRUCTION AND ASSEM-
BLY OF TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT AND ACCESORIES BRANCH: MAQUILADORA AND MANUFACTUR-
ING INDUSTRIES (1980-2006)
Wages Wages Inflation Real Real Real
Index Wages Wages Maquiladora
Wages
Real
Manufac-
MAQUI- MANUFAC- Dec. MAQUI- MANUFAC- turing
Year LADORAS TURING1 1982=100 LADORAS TURING1 Wages
1980 0.237 0.600 35.2 0.673 1.702 0.396
1981 0.308 0.829 45.1 0.684 1.839 0.372
1982 0.551 1.260 71.6 0.769 1.759 0.437
1983 0.870 1.989 144.6 0.602 1.375 0.438
1984 1.358 2.964 239.3 0.568 1.239 0.458
1985 2.024 4.645 377.5 0.536 1.231 0.436
1986 3.631 8.359 703.0 0.517 1.189 0.434
1987 8.696 15.720 1,629.6 0.534 0.965 0.553
1988 18.259 30.513 3,490.1 0.523 0.874 0.598
1989 22.857 37.524 4,188.4 0.546 0.896 0.609
1990 29.483 51.692 5,304.7 0.556 0.974 0.570
1991 35.628 67.253 6,506.8 0.548 1.034 0.530
1992 42.944 86.214 7,515.9 0.571 1.147 0.498
1993 49.227 94.915 8,248.8 0.597 1.151 0.519
1994 56.425 104.373 8,823.4 0.639 1.183 0.541
1995 72.154 111.962 11,911.5 0.606 0.940 0.644
1996 94.866 129.992 16,006.5 0.593 0.812 0.730
1997 115.666 161.502 19,308.0 0.599 0.836 0.716
1998 138.228 189.310 22,383.4 0.618 0.846 0.730
1999 164.066 227.387 26,095.8 0.629 0.871 0.722
2000 184.855 275.608 28,572.7 0.647 0.965 0.671
2001 205.312 327.711 30,392.2 0.676 1.078 0.627
2002 227.779 343.050 31,921.1 0.714 1.075 0.664
2003 225.195 356.418 33,372.5 0.675 1.068 0.632
2004 231.811 372.763 34,937.2 0.664 1.067 0.622
2005 240.589 382.870 36,330.5 0.662 1.054 0.628
2006 247.199 389.225 37,649.1 0.657 1.034 0.635
1 From 1995 to 2006, branches 3841, automobile industry, and 3842, manufacture, repair and/or
assembly of transport equipment (excluding automobiles and trucks). From 1987 to 1994, class 3800,
construction, reconstruction and assembly of transport equipment and its parts. From 1980 to 1987,
classes 3821, 3831 and 3832.
Source: INEGI. Estadística de la industria maquiladora de exportación 1974-1982, 1979-1989, 1989-
1993, 1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1994-1999, 1995-2000; 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 at
http://www.inegi.gob.mx; ibid., Estadística industrial anual 1975-1982; ibid., Encuesta industrial anual
1983-1986; ibid., Encuesta industrial mensual 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006; Índice de precios de la Comisión
Nacional de Salarios Mínimos until 1982 and Índice de precios al consumidor by the Banco de México
from 1983 on.
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